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How climate risk is breaking US home insuranceCómo el riesgo climático está quebrando los seguros de hogar · V8 Master Engine

17 slides · 21 min · 2026-06-1517 láminas · 21 min · 2026-06-15 language
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How climate risk is breaking UShome insuranceMade for Freddy Vega, by Hanademi
  1. California's FAIR Plan exposure exploded from about $50B in 2018 to roughly $750B by 2026, a 15x jump.
  2. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac back about 70% of US mortgages now exposed to insurer failures.
  3. As State Farm dropped 72,000 California policies in 2024, the FAIR Plan added over 104,000 in just six months.
Cómo el riesgo climático estáquebrando los seguros de hogarMade for Freddy Vega, by Hanademi
  1. La exposición del FAIR Plan de California pasó de unos 50.000 millones en 2018 a cerca de 750.000 millones en 2026, 15 veces más.
  2. Fannie Mae y Freddie Mac respaldan cerca del 70% de las hipotecas de EE. UU. ahora expuestas a quiebras de aseguradoras.
  3. Mientras State Farm soltaba 72.000 pólizas en California en 2024, el FAIR Plan sumaba más de 104.000 en solo seis meses.
How much risk does California’slast-resort insurer back?Made for Freddy Vega, by HanademiSources: California FAIR Plan Association. (2026). Key statistics & data.; Roach, V. (2024). California FAIR Plan update February2024. California FAIR Plan Association.UnitUSD exposure$0$250B$500B$750B2018Dec 2023Sept 2024March 2026$50B$750B
The state's insurer of last resort now shoulders 15 times the risk it held in 2018, a balloon nobody planned to inflate. Each step up marks another wave of private carriers walking away and dumping homeowners onto the public plan.
¿Cuánto riesgo respalda la aseguradora deúltimo recurso de California?Made for Freddy Vega, by HanademiFuentes: California FAIR Plan Association. (2026). Key statistics & data.; Roach, V. (2024). California FAIR Plan update February2024. California FAIR Plan Association.UnidadExposición en USD$0$250 mil M$500 mil M$750 mil M2018dic 2023Sept 2024mar 2026$50 mil M$750 mil M
La aseguradora estatal de último recurso ahora carga 15 veces el riesgo que tenía en 2018, un globo que nadie planeó inflar. Cada escalón marca otra ola de aseguradoras privadas que se marchan y arrojan a los propietarios al plan público.
How did California’s state plan grow asState Farm pulled back?Made for Freddy Vega, by HanademiSources: California Department of Insurance. (2026). FAIR Plan policy counts, reported in The Financial Wire; WJBC. (2025, January 13).State Farm cancelled 72,000 California fire insurance policies in 2024.Different publishers and counting bases: State Farm non-renewals are a 2024 carrier figure (WJBC); the FAIR Plan gain is a six-month state-agencycount to March 2025 (California Department of Insurance).UnitpoliciesState Farm non-renewals (2024)72,000FAIR Plan gain (6 months)104,0001.4x
What private carriers shed, the state absorbs: the FAIR Plan added more than 104,000 policies in six months, reaching 555,868. These are two sides of one transfer: risk migrating from the private market to the public backstop.
¿Cómo creció el plan estatal cuando StateFarm recortó pólizas?Made for Freddy Vega, by HanademiFuentes: California Department of Insurance. (2026). FAIR Plan policy counts, reported in The Financial Wire; WJBC. (2025, January 13).State Farm cancelled 72,000 California fire insurance policies in 2024.Different publishers and counting bases: State Farm non-renewals are a 2024 carrier figure (WJBC); the FAIR Plan gain is a six-month state-agencycount to March 2025 (California Department of Insurance).UnidadPólizasNo renovaciones State Farm (2024)72.000Aumento FAIR Plan (6 meses)104.0001,4x
Lo que sueltan las aseguradoras privadas lo absorbe el estado: el FAIR Plan sumó más de 104.000 pólizas en seis meses, hasta 555.868. Son dos caras de una misma transferencia: el riesgo migra del mercado privado al respaldo público.
How sharply have California insurers cutpolicies since 2020?Made for Freddy Vega, by HanademiSources: MoneyGeek. (2026). California wildfire FAIR Plan insurer retreat; Public Policy Institute of California. (2025). A deeper look at California'shomeowner insurance challenges; Insurance Journal. (2026, April 27). Travelers plans to expand homeowners insurance in California.2020 policy volume indexed to 100; 2023 is 28% lower per the cited claim.Unitpolicies written (indexed)20201002023721.4x
New policies are vanishing: non-renewals outnumbered new sign-ups in 46 of California's 58 counties. Seven of California's 12 largest home insurers have reduced or exited since 2022. A few carriers (Travelers, Slide, Kingstone) now plan to re-enter, but the retreat still dwarfs the return.
¿Cuánto han reducido las aseguradoras deCalifornia las pólizas desde 2020?Made for Freddy Vega, by HanademiFuentes: MoneyGeek. (2026). California wildfire FAIR Plan insurer retreat; Public Policy Institute of California. (2025). A deeper look at California'shomeowner insurance challenges; Insurance Journal. (2026, April 27). Travelers plans to expand homeowners insurance in California.Volumen de polizas de 2020 indexado a 100; 2023 es 28% menor segun la fuente citada.UnidadPólizas emitidas (indexado)20201002023721,4x
Las pólizas nuevas se desvanecen: las no renovaciones superaron a las altas en 46 de los 58 condados de California. Siete de las 12 mayores aseguradoras de viviendas de California redujeron o abandonaron desde 2022. Algunas (Travelers, Slide, Kingstone) planean regresar, pero la retirada aún supera al retorno.
How much insurance comes from the statein California’s riskiest counties?Made for Freddy Vega, by HanademiSources: MoneyGeek. (2026). California wildfire FAIR Plan insurer retreat.Unitshare of policies33%Written by insurer of last resort
In California's highest wildfire-risk counties, roughly a third of all home insurance now comes from the state's last-resort plan. When a third of a market leans on the backstop, the private market in those places has effectively collapsed.
¿Cuánto seguro aporta el estado en loscondados más riesgosos de California?Made for Freddy Vega, by HanademiFuentes: MoneyGeek. (2026). California wildfire FAIR Plan insurer retreat.UnidadProporción de pólizas33 %Emitidas por el asegurador de ultimorecurso
En los condados de California con mayor riesgo de incendios, cerca de un tercio del seguro de vivienda proviene ya del plan estatal de último recurso. Cuando un tercio del mercado se apoya en el respaldo, el mercado privado en esos lugares prácticamente colapsó.
How quickly are US home insurance hikesaccelerating?Made for Freddy Vega, by HanademiSources: LendingTree. (2025). State of home insurance: 2025.Unitannual rate increase0%5%10%11.4%2021202220232024
US home insurance rose about 40% over six years, and the annual jump nearly doubled to 11.4% by 2024. The curve steepens year over year, the signature of a market repricing risk faster than wages can follow.
¿A qué ritmo se aceleran las alzas delseguro de vivienda estadounidense?Made for Freddy Vega, by HanademiFuentes: LendingTree. (2025). State of home insurance: 2025.UnidadAlza de tarifa anual0 %5 %10 %11,4 %2021202220232024
El seguro de vivienda en EE. UU. subió cerca del 40% en seis años, y el alza anual casi se duplicó hasta 11,4% en 2024. La curva se empina año tras año, la firma de un mercado que reajusta el riesgo más rápido de lo que los salarios pueden seguir.
Reinsurance costs jumped 37% in January2023, the hardest market in a generation.Reinsurance is the insurance that insurers buy; global costs rose every year from 2018to 2024, and that bill lands in household premiums.Sources: MyNewMarkets. (2023, January 17). January renewals see hardest property catastrophe reinsurance rates in generation.
Reinsurance costs jumped 37% in January 2023, the hardest market in a generation. Reinsurance is the insurance that insurers buy; global costs rose every year from 2018 to 2024, and that bill lands in household premiums.
Los costos de reaseguro saltaron 37% enenero de 2023, el mercado más duro enuna generación.El reaseguro es el seguro que compran las aseguradoras; los costos globales subieroncada año de 2018 a 2024, y esa factura cae en las primas de los hogares.Fuentes: MyNewMarkets. (2023, January 17). January renewals see hardest property catastrophe reinsurance rates in generation.
Los costos de reaseguro saltaron 37% en enero de 2023, el mercado más duro en una generación. El reaseguro es el seguro que compran las aseguradoras; los costos globales subieron cada año de 2018 a 2024, y esa factura cae en las primas de los hogares.
What is Florida’s average yearly homeinsurance bill?Made for Freddy Vega, by HanademiSources: Levy Economics Institute. (2026). A premium crisis: Climate change threatens homeowner's insurance, housing, and financialstability.UnitUSD per year$14,140Florida$10,964Louisiana$7,762Oklahoma$6,005Texas$5,984Colorado
Disaster-prone states pay a brutal premium: Florida's average bill dwarfs Colorado's by more than $8,000 a year. These averages now rival a second property tax for many coastal and southern families.
¿Cuál es la factura anual promedio delseguro de vivienda en Florida?Made for Freddy Vega, by HanademiFuentes: Levy Economics Institute. (2026). A premium crisis: Climate change threatens homeowner's insurance, housing, and financialstability.UnidadUSD por año$14.140Florida$10.964Luisiana$7.762Oklahoma$6.005Texas$5.984Colorado
Los estados propensos a desastres pagan una prima brutal: la factura media de Florida supera a la de Colorado en más de 8.000 dólares al año. Estos promedios ya rivalizan con un segundo impuesto predial para muchas familias costeras y del sur.
How much income do Louisiana householdsspend on home insurance?Made for Freddy Vega, by HanademiSources: Climate and Community Institute. (2025). Shared fates: Rising insurance costs in Louisiana.Unitshare of householdsSpend over 10% of income oninsurance59%Premiums jumped over 40%(2021-2024)40%
Most Louisiana households now spend over a tenth of their income just on home insurance, and 40% saw premiums leap more than 40% in three years. When the insurance bill alone consumes a tenth of income, dropping coverage becomes a rational, dangerous choice.
¿Cuánto ingreso destinan los hogares deLuisiana al seguro de vivienda?Made for Freddy Vega, by HanademiFuentes: Climate and Community Institute. (2025). Shared fates: Rising insurance costs in Louisiana.UnidadProporción de hogaresGastan mas del 10% del ingresoen seguro59 %Primas subieron mas del 40%(2021-2024)40 %
La mayoría de los hogares de Luisiana ya gasta más de una décima parte de sus ingresos solo en seguro, y al 40% le subieron las primas más del 40% en tres años. Cuando solo la factura del seguro consume una décima parte del ingreso, quedarse sin cobertura se vuelve una elección racional y peligrosa.
About 12.2 million owner-occupiedhomes, nearly one in seven, now carryno insurance at all.Since 2020 some 1.2 million owners have been pushed onto state insurers of last resort,and 7% to 13% of US homes are uninsured.Sources: LendingTree. (2026). Nearly 1 in 7 homes across US are uninsured; Natural Resources Defense Council. (2025). Uninsurable country.
About 12.2 million owner-occupied homes, nearly one in seven, now carry no insurance at all. Since 2020 some 1.2 million owners have been pushed onto state insurers of last resort, and 7% to 13% of US homes are uninsured.
Cerca de 12,2 millones de viviendasocupadas por sus dueños, casi una de cadasiete, no tienen ningún seguro.Desde 2020, cerca de 1,2 millones de propietarios fueron empujados a aseguradorasestatales de último recurso, y entre el 7% y el 13% de las viviendas de EE. UU. carecen deseguro.Fuentes: LendingTree. (2026). Nearly 1 in 7 homes across US are uninsured; Natural Resources Defense Council. (2025). Uninsurable country.
Cerca de 12,2 millones de viviendas ocupadas por sus dueños, casi una de cada siete, no tienen ningún seguro. Desde 2020, cerca de 1,2 millones de propietarios fueron empujados a aseguradoras estatales de último recurso, y entre el 7% y el 13% de las viviendas de EE. UU. carecen de seguro.
How much uninsured home value belongs toBlack and Hispanic owners?Made for Freddy Vega, by HanademiSources: Consumer Federation of America. (2024). Exposed: A report on 1.6 trillion dollars of uninsured Americanhomes.UnitUSD property value at riskHispanic-owned homes$339BBlack-owned homes$206B
Of the $1.6 trillion in uninsured home value at risk, $339B is Hispanic-owned and $206B Black-owned. The coverage gap is not evenly spread; it concentrates the financial blast radius on households with the least cushion.
¿Cuánto valor inmobiliario sin seguro tienenpropietarios negros e hispanos?Made for Freddy Vega, by HanademiFuentes: Consumer Federation of America. (2024). Exposed: A report on 1.6 trillion dollars of uninsuredAmerican homes.UnidadValor de vivienda en riesgo en USDViviendas de propietarios hispanos$339 mil MViviendas de propietarios negros$206 mil M
De los 1,6 billones de dólares en valor de vivienda sin seguro en riesgo, 339.000 millones son de hogares hispanos y 206.000 millones de hogares negros. La brecha de cobertura no se reparte por igual; concentra el radio de impacto financiero en los hogares con menos colchón.
Where did federal auditors find the steepestinflation-adjusted premium hikes?Made for Freddy Vega, by HanademiSources: U.S. Government Accountability Office. (2026). Homeowners insurance: Premiums generally trackedinflation but rose more in disaster-prone areas (GAO-26-107867).Unitpremium change after inflation25%Southern coastal high-risk3%National average
Inflation-adjusted, the GAO found national premiums up just 3% from 2019 to 2024, but 25% or more on the southern coast. This is the honest counter: in real terms the crisis is regional, not a uniform national spike. Nominal increases reported elsewhere are larger.
¿Dónde hallaron los auditores federales lasmayores alzas ajustadas por inflación?Made for Freddy Vega, by HanademiFuentes: U.S. Government Accountability Office. (2026). Homeowners insurance: Premiums generally trackedinflation but rose more in disaster-prone areas (GAO-26-107867).UnidadCambio de prima tras inflación25 %Costa sur de alto riesgo3 %Promedio nacional
Ajustadas por inflación, la GAO halló que las primas nacionales subieron solo 3% de 2019 a 2024, pero 25% o más en la costa sur. Este es el contrapunto honesto: en términos reales la crisis es regional, no un alza nacional uniforme. Los aumentos nominales reportados en otras fuentes son mayores.
How many homes have climate risks theirpremiums ignore?Made for Freddy Vega, by HanademiSources: First Street Foundation. (2023). The 9th national risk assessment: The climate insurance bubble; Hoodline. (2026, June 3).Central Florida homes face hidden flood risk despite FEMA maps.Categories overlap and do not sum to the 39 million headline.UnitpropertiesFlood outside FEMA zones12MHigh wind23.9MWildfire zones4.4MOutside any coverage6.8M
First Street counts 39 million properties with flood, wind or wildfire risk not yet priced in, including 12 million flood-exposed homes outside FEMA zones. In Florida alone, nearly 350,000 properties face flood hazards FEMA's official maps never flag as high risk: the repricing has barely begun.
¿Cuántas viviendas tienen riesgosclimáticos que sus primas ignoran?Made for Freddy Vega, by HanademiFuentes: First Street Foundation. (2023). The 9th national risk assessment: The climate insurance bubble; Hoodline. (2026, June 3).Central Florida homes face hidden flood risk despite FEMA maps.Las categorias se solapan y no suman los 39 millones del titular.UnidadPropiedadesInundacion fuera de zonasFEMA12 MViento fuerte23,9 MZonas de incendios4,4 MSin ninguna cobertura6,8 M
First Street cuenta 39 millones de propiedades con riesgo de inundación, viento o incendio aún no reflejado en sus primas, incluidos 12 millones de viviendas inundables fuera de las zonas de FEMA. Solo en Florida, casi 350.000 propiedades enfrentan peligros de inundación que los mapas oficiales de FEMA nunca marcan como de alto riesgo: el reajuste de precios apenas ha comenzado.
Two-thirds of US residential flood losses gocompletely uninsured.Moody's modeling makes flooding the country's most underinsured disaster, a gapwaiting for the next storm to expose it.Sources: Moody's RMS. (2025). Why does the U.S. flood insurance gap persist?
Two-thirds of US residential flood losses go completely uninsured. Moody's modeling makes flooding the country's most underinsured disaster, a gap waiting for the next storm to expose it.
Dos tercios de las pérdidasresidenciales por inundación en EE. UU.quedan totalmente sin seguro.El modelo de Moody's hace de las inundaciones el desastre con mayor falta de coberturadel país, una brecha que la próxima tormenta dejará al descubierto.Fuentes: Moody's RMS. (2025). Why does the U.S. flood insurance gap persist?
Dos tercios de las pérdidas residenciales por inundación en EE. UU. quedan totalmente sin seguro. El modelo de Moody's hace de las inundaciones el desastre con mayor falta de cobertura del país, una brecha que la próxima tormenta dejará al descubierto.
How do California and Florida backstops’promises compare with available cash?Made for Freddy Vega, by HanademiSources: ProgramBusiness. (2024, March 25). California FAIR Plan exec: Carriers 'one event away' from assessment as exposure soars;Florida Office of Insurance Regulation. (2024). OIR issues update on Florida's property insurance market.FAIR Plan claims-paying ability combines $200M capital plus $700M cash = $0.9B, per the cited claim.UnitUSDCalifornia FAIR Plan (2024)ExposureClaims-paying ability373.3×$336B$900MFlorida Citizens (2024)7.8×$113B$14.4B
California's FAIR Plan backed $336B in exposure with about $900M in cash; Florida's Citizens held $113B against $14.4B it could actually pay. These are banks that could never survive a run: one big event triggers a forced assessment on other insurers and their customers.
¿Cuánto prometen los respaldos deCalifornia y Florida frente a sus fondos?Made for Freddy Vega, by HanademiFuentes: ProgramBusiness. (2024, March 25). California FAIR Plan exec: Carriers 'one event away' from assessment as exposure soars;Florida Office of Insurance Regulation. (2024). OIR issues update on Florida's property insurance market.La capacidad de pago del FAIR Plan combina 200 millones de capital mas 700 millones en efectivo = 0,9B, segun la fuente citada.UnidadUSDFAIR Plan de California (2024)ExposicionCapacidad de pago de siniestros373,3×$336 mil M$900 MCitizens de Florida (2024)7,8×$113 mil M$14,4 mil M
El FAIR Plan respaldaba 336.000 millones de exposición con unos 900 millones en efectivo; Citizens de Florida tenía 113.000 millones frente a los 14.400 que realmente podía pagar. Son bancos que nunca sobrevivirían a una corrida: un solo evento grande dispara una derrama forzada sobre otras aseguradoras y sus clientes.
How fast is Citizens’ claims-paying abilityshrinking in Florida?Made for Freddy Vega, by HanademiSources: Citizens Property Insurance Corporation. (2026, February 1). Annual report of aggregate net probablemaximum losses, financing options, and potential assessments.UnitUSD claims-paying ability2024$14.4B2026 (projected)$9.9B
Citizens projects just $9.9B in claims-paying ability for 2026, down from $14.4B in 2024 as the market softens. The cushion shrinks even as exposure stays enormous, narrowing the margin before a forced bailout.
¿A qué ritmo baja la capacidad de pago deCitizens de Florida?Made for Freddy Vega, by HanademiFuentes: Citizens Property Insurance Corporation. (2026, February 1). Annual report of aggregate net probablemaximum losses, financing options, and potential assessments.UnidadCapacidad de pago en USD2024$14,4 mil M2026 (proyectado)$9,9 mil M
Citizens proyecta solo 9.900 millones de capacidad de pago para 2026, frente a los 14.400 de 2024 al relajarse el mercado. El colchón se encoge aunque la exposición sigue siendo enorme, reduciendo el margen antes de un rescate forzado.
What did the FAIR Plan pay towardestimated 2025 LA fire losses?Made for Freddy Vega, by HanademiSources: California Department of Insurance. (2025). Bulletin 2025-4: Updated guidance regarding insurer recoupment procedures; Yale LawJournal. (2025). The uninsurable future: The climate threat to property insurance, and how to stop it.Both bars share one basis: the amount paid (~$914M) and estimated total losses (~$4B) are reported together by the California Department of Insurance(FAIR Plan, Bulletin 2025-4).UnitUSD$4BEstimated total losses$914MAlready paid out
After the Palisades and Eaton fires, the FAIR Plan had paid about $914M against estimated total losses near $4B. The January 2025 Los Angeles wildfires destroyed over 16,000 structures, with broader economic losses estimated as high as $250 billion.
¿Cuánto pagó el FAIR Plan por pérdidasestimadas de incendios de 2025?Made for Freddy Vega, by HanademiFuentes: California Department of Insurance. (2025). Bulletin 2025-4: Updated guidance regarding insurer recoupment procedures; Yale LawJournal. (2025). The uninsurable future: The climate threat to property insurance, and how to stop it.Both bars share one basis: the amount paid (~$914M) and estimated total losses (~$4B) are reported together by the California Department of Insurance(FAIR Plan, Bulletin 2025-4).UnidadUSD$4 mil MPérdidas totales estimadas$914 MYa pagado
Tras los incendios de Palisades y Eaton, el FAIR Plan había pagado cerca de 914 millones frente a pérdidas totales estimadas en unos 4.000 millones. Los incendios de Los Ángeles de enero de 2025 destruyeron más de 16.000 estructuras, con pérdidas económicas más amplias estimadas hasta en 250.000 millones de dólares.
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac back 70% ofUS mortgages exposed to insurer failures.Research by Sastry, Sen and Tenekedjieva shows fragile insurers' insolvencies directlyraise mortgage defaults after disasters: a household crisis becomes a financial-systemcrisis.Sources: Sastry, P., Sen, I., & Tenekedjieva, A.-M. (2024). When insurers exit: Climate losses, fragile insurers, and mortgage markets; DePillis, L.(2024, December 15). Backers of most U.S. mortgages have done little about climate risks. The New York Times; AmeriSave. (2026). Fannie Mae vs.Freddie Mac.
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac back 70% of US mortgages exposed to insurer failures. Research by Sastry, Sen and Tenekedjieva shows fragile insurers' insolvencies directly raise mortgage defaults after disasters: a household crisis becomes a financial-system crisis.
Fannie Mae y Freddie Mac respaldan el 70%de las hipotecas de EE.UU. expuestas aquiebras de aseguradoras.La investigación de Sastry, Sen y Tenekedjieva muestra que la insolvencia deaseguradoras frágiles eleva directamente los impagos hipotecarios tras los desastres:una crisis de hogares se vuelve una crisis del sistema financiero.Fuentes: Sastry, P., Sen, I., & Tenekedjieva, A.-M. (2024). When insurers exit: Climate losses, fragile insurers, and mortgage markets; DePillis, L.(2024, December 15). Backers of most U.S. mortgages have done little about climate risks. The New York Times; AmeriSave. (2026). Fannie Mae vs.Freddie Mac.
Fannie Mae y Freddie Mac respaldan el 70% de las hipotecas de EE.UU. expuestas a quiebras de aseguradoras. La investigación de Sastry, Sen y Tenekedjieva muestra que la insolvencia de aseguradoras frágiles eleva directamente los impagos hipotecarios tras los desastres: una crisis de hogares se vuelve una crisis del sistema financiero.

The research behind this deck

Across America's disaster states, insurers are retreating, premiums are outrunning incomes, and millions of homes sit uninsured. State backstops absorb the overflow with promises they cannot fund, leaving the mortgage system and homeowners exposed long before any family ever moves.

Key findings

The argument

This research is published in English and Spanish. Ver en español

La investigación detrás de esta presentación

En los estados de desastres de EE. UU., las aseguradoras se retiran, las primas superan a los ingresos y millones de viviendas quedan sin seguro. Los respaldos estatales absorben el exceso con promesas que no pueden financiar, dejando expuestos al sistema hipotecario y a los propietarios.

Hallazgos clave

El argumento

Esta investigación se publica en inglés y español. Read in English

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